Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam- Purpose of Jalsa Salana

Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam

Annual Convention U.K. 2010— 44th Jalsa Salana

Objectives, Purposes & Blessings of Jalsa Salana

In the Words of The Promised Messiah (Peace be on him)

Purpose of Jalsa Salana“ The primary purpose of this Convention is to enable every sincere individual to personally experience religious benefits; They may enhance their knowledge and –due to their being blessed and enabled by Allah, The Exalted- their perception [ of Allah ] may progress. Among its secondary benefits is that this congregational meeting together will promote mutual introduction among all brothers, and it will strengthen the fraternal ties within this Community..”
(Ishtihar 7 Dec. 1892, Majmoo`ah Ishtiharat Vol. I, Page 340).

Not an Ordinary Convention

“ It is essential for all those who can afford to undertake the journey, that they must come to attend this Convention which embodies many blessed objectives. They should disregard minor inconveniences in the cause of Allah and His prophet (peace be upon him.). Allah yields reward to the sincere persons at every step of their way, and no labour and hardship, undertaken in His way, ever goes to waste. I re-emphasize that you must not rank this convention in the same league as other, ordinary, human assemblies. This is a phenomenon that is based purely on the Divine Help, for propagation of Islam.”
(Ishtihar 7 Dec. 1892, Majmoo`ah Ishtiharat Vol. I, Page 341)

Prayer

“ I conclude with the prayer that everyone who travels for [attending] this Convention that is for the sake of Allah: May Allah, the Exalted, be with him, reward him in abundant measure, have mercy on him, ease up for him his circumstances of hardship and anxiety and eliminate his anguish and grief. May He grant him freedom from every single hardship and lay open for him the ways of [achieving] his cherished goals, and raise him up, on the day of Judgment, among those of His servants who are the recipients of His blessings and Mercy. May He be their Guardian in their absence until after their journey comes to an end. O Allah! O Sublime One and Bestower of bounties, the Ever Merciful and One Who Resolves all problems, do grant all these prayers, and grant us Victory over our opponents with scintillating signs, because You alone have all the prowess and power. Aameen! Aameen!!”
(Ishtihar 7 Dec. 1892, Majmoo`ah Ishtiharat Vol. I, Page 342)

Ahmadiyya Annual Convention U.K. 2010

                                                                                        

Venue:

Hadeeqatul Mahdi

(Oaklands Farm)

Green Street, East Worldham,

 Alton,

Hampshire. GU34  3AU

United Kingdom

***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***  

44th JALSA SALANA

 Annual Convention UK

  Programme

Friday 30th July

11.30 Lunch and preparation for Jumua’h prayers

 16.25 Hoisting of Liwa-e-Ahmadiyyat (Ahmadiyya Flag)

 OPENING SESSION

16.30 Recitation from the Holy Quran,

 Urdu Poem andTranslation

13.00 Jumua’h and Asr Prayers

Inaugural address By Hadhrat Amirul

 

Momineen Khalifatul Masih V (aba) 
Silent Prayer

20.00 Dinner

 21.00 Maghrib and Isha Prayers

SATURDAY 31st JULY

SECOND SESSION

10.00 Recitation from the Holy Quran, Urdu translation

and Urdu Poem

 10.20

 (English)

(ra)

By Mr. Fareed Ahmad, Secretary External Affairs UK

11.20 Urdu Poem

 Ladies’ Jalsa Gah.

  13.30 Dhuhr and Asr Prayers. 14.00 Lunch

THIRD SESSION

15.30 Short speeches by distiguished guests.

16.00

 Recitation from Holy Quran, Translation and Urdu Poem

Address by Hadhrat Amirul Momineen

 Khalifatul Massih V (aba)

20.00 Dinner 21.00 Maghrib and Isha Prayers

( Programme will be transmitted live from Ladies Jalsa Gah)

 Recitation from the Holy Quran, Urdu Poem,

 Arabic Qaseeda and Translation

11.30

 (English)

By Maulana Mubarak Ahmad Nazir Sahib,

 Missionary Incharge Canada

10.50

Some impacts of the institution of Wassiyat ( Urdu )By Maulana Abdul Awwal Khan Sahib,

 

Missionary Incharge Bangladesh 
SUNDAY 1st AUGUST

FOURTH SESSION

 10.00 Recitation from Holy Quran, Translation and Urdu Poem

 10.20

 (English)

 By Mr. Bilal Atkinson, Regional Amir, North East UK

10.50 Examples of obedience to KhilafatBy Maulana Naseer Ahmad Anjum Sahib,

 Professor Jamia Ahmadiyya Rabwah 12.00

 (English)By Mr. Rafiq Ahmed Hayat, Amir, Jama’at Ahmadiyya UK.

 12.30 Announcements, Preparation for Initiation Ceremony 13.00

 13.30 Dhuhr and Asr Prayers. 14.00 Lunch

 

FINAL SESSION

 15.30 Short speeches by distiguished guests. 16.00 Recitation from the Holy Quran,Translation, Urdu Poem,

 Arabic Qaseeda and Translation

 

Silent Prayer  

*********************************************

   

It is absurd to indict Pakistan and its ISI for playing Double game

By A Khokar     July 28, 2010

The ground breaking release of wikileaks may serve the anti war lobbyist in US or expose the follies of Obama administration at home or not——but in the battle fields in Afghanistan, wikileaks material is no surprise for any one.

But the heavy weight Wikileaks has surely indicted Pakistan, an ally and a front state in war against terror, playing a double game of abetting the so called US enemy —Taliban. It certainly helps US build a negative perception against Pakistan and its ISI that they being an ally—-are in fact the ring leader of terrorism. This may give leverage to US lead NATO forces that if need be US reserve the right and may be justified on this pretext to extend the war beyond Afghan borders and take into Pakistan.

This is an absurd attempt to pressurise Pakistan and fixation of its ISI; the country which suffered the most as US ally in the war against terrorism being fought in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is since ages better known by the old world as a ‘highway of conquest’  and the ‘graveyard of empires,’ but the ‘old world’ also knew——Afghanistan; as ‘the Eastern Round About’; where many old adventurists came but Afghanistan always spun them out of its orbit—- badly bruised.

The recent history speaks that British’s and then the Russians were left with no option but to go out humiliated.

In the ongoing so called war against Terrorism; while other coalition forces are also looking for their exits. USA is also finding it untenable. US is alone ——-and has got no victory in sight and is also retreating dismayed and defeated—-but for all the atrocities carried out by US to gain her foot hold; she has got blood of millions at their hands.

If the ‘American relatives of Lockerbie Pan Am disaster’ can feel justified to force the Libyan government for their sponsored terrorism and to be awarded with million of dollars as compensation or blood money; one wonders how many trillions of dollars Americans have to pay back for their savagery, killings and destruction brought in Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and all other places where American have committed their atrocities.

Afghanistan: The Pentagon’s Lost War

By William Pfaff     Jul 27, 2010

While it is unquestionable that Barack Obama made the war in Afghanistan “his” war, it also is true that it was served to him on a platter and with a gun pressed against his back.

It was in fact the Pentagon’s chosen war. Had he refused to fight it, Pentagon insider stories, the opposition press and the Republican Party would have attacked him and his new administration for demonstrating incompetence in dealing with world affairs, naive and pacifist inclinations, and a willingness to “surrender” to terrorism.

Mr. Obama, a presidential candidate wholly without military experience, decided to forestall the inevitable attacks upon him as someone incapable of dealing with security issues, by accompanying his promise to end George W. Bush’s Iraq war and making peace in Iraq (yet to be accomplished—as was foreseeable at the time) by re-launching and winning “the right war,” the war in Afghanistan against al-Qaida and the Taliban.

This was a half-baked notion since al-Qaida’s survival as a serious terrorist organization, rather than an internationally notorious franchise for home grown terrorism, was at the time doubted, and the Taliban was clearly a domestic Afghan political and social phenomenon possessing no international dimension other than in neighbouring Pakistan. It had neither the design nor the capability to attack the United States or Europe—nor any interest in doing so.

The Taliban had done nothing directly to harm the United States, but those in the United States who, for various reasons, wanted the war in Afghanistan prosecuted by Washington, held that unless the U.S. defeated the Taliban and controlled Afghanistan, that country would be forever a “safe haven” for terrorism. Much the same thing could be said of most of the world’s unoccupied spaces (including Utah and Idaho).

The ascendant force in the Pentagon when Obama took office was a group of younger officers associated with Gen. David Petraeus, author of a restatement of classical political as well as military anti-insurgent tactics in a forthcoming U.S. Army Field Manual. He had been named commandant of Central Command (covering the Middle East and Central Asia) by Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, and in turn placed a protégé, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, in command in Afghanistan. Petraeus was credited with what actually was not (and still is not) “victory” in Iraq because he had recommended and commanded the “surge” of reinforcements sent into Iraq in 2007-08, and was associated with the program that had recruited and paid Sunni tribal forces to restore order in their own tribal areas by driving out al-Qaida’s supporters (tacitly in support of the dominant Shiite political forces in Baghdad, expected to win the forthcoming 2010 parliamentary elections and form an independent coalition government—which has yet to happen).

The new President Obama sent Gen. McChrystal to Kabul to assess the situation and recommend a program of action. To no one’s surprise, he recommended a “surge” of troops to Afghanistan, as in Iraq, to a total that today already is at nearly 100,000 American soldiers and contractors, plus a huge program of civilian “nation builders” in which Americans would go into villages to teach and promote democracy, school-building, women’s education and modern administration. This would follow an initial phase in which American forces would “clear” an area of Taliban and would then install newly trained Afghan soldiers and police to secure or “hold” the newly liberated area while NATO combat forces would move ahead to clear still more of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a country of some 250,000 square miles (646,000 square kilometres). It is larger than France, most of it rugged and very difficult to access. Its population is estimated by the U.N. to be some 30 million, 80 percent of it rural and tribal, a society profoundly disrupted by virtually continuous war since 1979, and mostly illiterate.

President Obama asked Gens. McChrystal and Petraeus how long their program would take. They assured him that American troops could begin shipping home in a year, and so the president assured the American people.

It is difficult to imagine how Gens. McChrystal and Petraeus could in good faith have presented him with so fantastical a plan, or how Barack Obama, who is surely not a fool, could have accepted it. But the press, the Congress and the American people nodded collectively that this was a scheme of benevolent nation-building that could transform and pacify Afghanistan. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had written a few months before in Foreign Affairs magazine that the United States could and should “change the world, and in [America’s] image.” To do so, she wrote, was “a uniquely American realism.”

Such fantasy is bipartisan. It can by no means simply be blamed on Obama and the Democrats. It is as American as apple pie, and Gens. McChrystal and Petraeus’s strategy for pacifying Afghanistan came straight, freshly baked, out of the Pentagon.

Today the fantasy has collapsed. The accounts of journalists and of soldiers themselves, the small-unit combat histories newly disclosed in the WikiLeaks classified documents, have made plain what every informed grown-up American should have known from the beginning, that U.S. forces are being defeated in this preposterous effort, just as Soviet and British imperial forces were defeated before them.

Barack Obama might today call in Gen. Petraeus, and his predecessor Gen. McChrystal, together with the latter’s “Team America” of high school jocks, and tell them that as they are responsible for this fiasco of destruction and useless slaughter, they will now make a public apology to the American people, and take charge of executing a mass American retreat from Afghanistan, with as little loss as possible to American forces and the Afghan people.

There is nothing to be gained by staying.

But that is impossible. Failure is merely a steppingstone to success in the American military and political systems. No one accepts responsibility.

The war will go on until it is extended to Pakistan, and possibly beyond. Casualties will steadily mount. No one can predict when the inevitable moment will come, but it will come, when the last Americans are lifted by helicopter off an embassy rooftop, and the Afghans, Pakistanis, Indians, Tajiks and others at last are left to reconstruct their own world.

Is US  getting ready to see the repeat of  history?

The last helicopter lift from Siagon Vietnam

‘Wet Micro Burst’ may have caused the Air Blue crash at Margala Hills

Illustration of a microburst.

Note the downward motion of the air until it hits ground level. It then spreads outward in all directions. The wind regime in a microburst is opposite to that of a tornado.   

****

Compiled by A Khokar    July    27, 2010                                       

Aviation security of USA is of the opinion that Keeping in view the sudden crash of the Air Blue aircraft, it is presumed that owing to the bad wet weather and with very low clouds, the phenomenon of ‘Wet Micro  Burst’ occurred which is often a very localized column of sinking air, producing damaging divergent and straight-line down ward winds at the surface that are similar to, but distinguishable from, tornadoes which generally have convergent damage.

 The scale and suddenness of a microburst makes it a great danger to aircrafts due to the low-level ‘wind shear draft’ which  may cause a sudden plunge by its gust front and Aircraft may not remain air borne.

Several fatal crashes have been attributed to this phenomenon over the past several decades.

Illustration of a microburst.

Please note the downward motion of the air until it hits ground level. It then spreads outward in all directions. The wind regime in a microburst is opposite to that of a tornado.

Once any unfortunate air craft enters in ‘Microburst Zone, air craft is sucked down and finds nothing to hold on or to keep  itself air borne; it hits the ground with such a massive impact that it is shattered into pieces—- as we have witnessed in this Air Blue disaster; where as aircraft hiegt was minimal  but  non of the parts like fuselodeg etc are seen intact..

************

Up dates  july 29, 2010

What is Microbursts

Downburst less than 2.5 miles in diameter

A downburst is a strong downdraft which includes an outburst of potentially damaging winds on or near the ground. If the diameter of the downburst is less than 2.5 miles, it is called a microburst. The diagrams below depict the evolution of a microburst.A microburst initially develops as the downdraft begins its descent from cloud base. The downdraft accelerates and within minutes, reaches the ground (contact stage). It is during the contact stage that the highest winds are observed. During the outburst stage (above), the wind “curls” as the cold air of the microburst moves away from the point of impact with the ground. During the cushion stage, winds about the curl continue to accelerate, posing a great threat to nearby aircraft.These are very weak, high based showers without thunder, but with microbursts. Studies have shown that they predominantly occur in the High Plains and western U.S.: particularly in unstable, very dry low level environments with surface temperature-dew point spreads of 30 to 50 degrees and an area of mid-level moisture as a source

for the weak showers.


Photograph by: Moller

 The cloud on the left is developing, whereas the fuzzy anvil on the right has matured and is producing a trail of virga. Microbursts would be most likely to occur beneath the virga, when the downdraft reaches the ground. Several of these virga showers did produce microbursts in the Lubbock, Texas area.


Photograph by: Moller

The same day, near the Lubbock Airport, we see several of the small microbursts which emanated from the virga patch in the upper right corner of the photograph. Wind shifts of 35 to 40 MPH were noted shortly after this time, with a rapid onset and cessation of the wind gusts. 

 

Wickileaks: Afghan War Diary 2004-2010

Summary

25th July 2010;

WikiLeaks has released a document set called the Afghan War Diary, an extraordinary compendium of over 91,000 reports Secret Documents covering the war in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010.

The reports, while written by soldiers and intelligence officers, and mainly describing lethal military actions involving the United States military, also include intelligence information, reports of meetings with political figures, and related detail.

The document collection is available on a dedicated webpage.

The reports cover most units from the US Army with the exception of most US Special Forces’ activities. The reports do not generally cover top secret operations or European and other ISAF Forces operations.

We have delayed the release of some 15,000 reports from the total archive as part of a harm minimization process demanded by our source. After further review, these reports will be released, with occasional redactions, and eventually in full, as the security situation in Afghanistan permits.

The data is provided in HTML (web), CSV (comma-separated value) and SQL (database) formats, and also was rendered into KML (Keyhole Markup Language) mapping data that can be used with Google Earth. Please note that the checksums will change.

  • Complete dump of the website, HTML format 75 MB
  • All entries, CSV format 15 MB
    • (SHA1: d6b82f955a7beb9589f92e9487c74669d1912a34)
    • Raw data in comma-separated value format for further processing.
  • All entries, SQL format 16M MB
    • (SHA1: 9463f73ebbcd3f95899a138d6ba9817e1b6b800d)
    • Raw data in SQL format for further processing.
  • All entries, KML format 16 MB
    • (SHA1: 34562c0c7722522161e40330d80ac9082014845f)
    • This archive contains all events in one KML file. This file needs much memory if opened with Google Earth.
  • All NATO entries, KML format 209 kB
    • (SHA1: 088ff8999a316f30e5e398021375fa3b4fc6349e)
    • Contains the events that were tagged with NATO.
  • Entries by month, KML format 16 MB
    • (SHA1: 01a5c0639e1e1e844b10e962a44849b2a521d092)
    • This archive provides the entries split by month. This makes it easier to browse the data in Google Earth on low power machines.
  • Entries with scale filter, KML format 981 kB
    • (SHA1: 4669c721b87775a44472f6688e768305c686beff)
    • File that will show a scale corresponding to the number of incidents in Google Earth. Each incident begins with a 0.5 base score, and 0.1 has been added for each incident involving humans. This set of data provides only events that have a scaling of 1.5.

To decompress the files you will need the program 7zip. A free client for Windows can be downloaded here. Please use your favorite search engine to find clients for other operating systems.

Source: www.wickileaks.com.

*********************

Spiegel International (A German Mag) describes the wikileaks matter  under differant haedings as follow:

Task Force 373: The Secret Hunters

The members of Task Force 373, a troop of US elite soldiers that includes Navy Seals and members of the Delta Force, receive their orders directly from the Pentagon and are independent of the chain of command of the international ISAF Afghanistan security forces. Their mission is to deactivate top Taliban and terrorists by either killing or capturing them.

For years, a major effort was made to keep a lid on the details of their deployment. With the leaking of the war logs on Sunday, however, their work is an open secret.

The mission reports also offer considerable information about the coalition troops’ classified list of enemies. The “Joint Prioritized Effects List” (JPEL), as it is soberly referred to in military circles, contains the names of Taliban, drug barons, bombmakers and al-Qaida members — each with a processing number and a priority level. The decision on whether or not to arrest or kill the targeted person is often left to the hunters themselves.

A total of 84 reports about JPEL actions can be found in the thousands of pieces of data. Experts consider it a fact that targeted killings are taking place in the war in Afghanistan. But no top military officials are willing to discuss the issue. The newly released data now show what command units like Task Force 373 are up to each night — and how things can also go terribly wrong.

A report on June 17, 2007, for example, includes a warning in the second sentence that this operation of the TF 373 must be “kept protected.” Details about the mission could not be provided to other countries contributing to the ISAF forces.

The aim was to kill prominent al-Qaida functionary Abu Laith al-Libi. The special forces suspected that the top terrorist and several of his followers were present at a Koran school the soldiers had been staking out for a number of days.

But after the impact of five American rockets, instead of finding al-Libi, the ground forces discovered six dead children in the rubble of the school. A further seriously injured child was also found but could not be saved.

*********

German Naivity

The newly emerged documents do not contain any information suggesting that German troops were involved in any excesses of violence against the civilian population or in any illegal clandestine operations. Nevertheless, they convey an image of Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, that is still devastating because they depict a German military that stumbled into the conflict with great naiveté.

The Germans thought that the northern provinces where their soldiers are stationed would be more peaceful compared to other provinces and that the situation would remain that way.

They were wrong. As far back as the end of 2005, resistance against the international troop presence began to grow — locals were either threatened by the Taliban and powerful warlords or their support was bought. Warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, for example, spurred the fighting by offering 100,000 to 500,000 afghanis ($2,000 to $10,000) to the leader of any insurgency group. Hekmatyar’s appeals and cash donations are carefully documented in the reports.

At the start of the deployment, some Bundeswehr soldiers jokingly called the small city of Kunduz “Bad Kunduz,” the word “Bad” being the German word officially bestowed on spa towns. But peaceful days in Kunduz, where a large number of German troops are stationed, have long been a thing of the past. At the very latest, the quiet ended on May 19, 2007. That day, three German soldiers were killed by a suicide bomber as they tried to buy refrigerators at a local market. Eight Afghan civilians also died in the first deadly attack deliberately targeted at Germans in the region.

In a “threat report” dated May 31, 2007, German troops based in Kunduz reported on the general situation following another suicide attack. “Contrary to all expectations of the Regional Command North, the attacks of the insurgents in Kunduz are going on as foreseen by the Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz and mentioned before several times,” the German document states, adding that more attacks, particularly against ISAF troops, “are strongly expected.”

The soldiers appear to have been correct to have felt they were under a state of siege. The documents that have been obtained are comprised primarily of so-called “threat reports,” thousands of danger scenarios and concrete warnings about planned attacks. These reports provide a clearer picture of the deterioration of the security situation in northern Afghanistan than the information provided by the German government or the federal parliament, the Bundestag, which must provide a legal mandate for the Bundeswehr’s deployments abroad. Police checkpoints are constantly attacked or come under fire, patrols are targeted in deadly ambushes and roadside bombs explode.

They also show how close northern Afghanistan has slid toward a new civil war and how little the Germans have achieved during their deployment in the Hindu Kush.

——-

The Flaws of the Silent Killer

The classified situation report from the “RC East” region in eastern Afghanistan at first reads like a routine transcript: “Oct. 17, 2009: At approximately 1300 ANA (Afghan National Army) received intelligence that approximately 20 insurgents were moving south of their position in the wadi (dried-out river bed). At approximately 1400 the Raven was launched, and flew directly to FB. We observed no enemy in the wadi.” But problems were then experienced with the flight of the Raven, a US military reconnaissance drone. “While making the U turn, approximately 300M from FB (Fire Base) — the bird suddenly lost altitude and crashed,” the report states.

Then the situation grew hectic: “Immediately we attempted to secure a dismounted patrol from FB to secure the bird, and prepared a patrol of 6 US (soldiers) 40 ANA (Afghan soldiers) … and requested immediate CCA (air cover) to over watch the crash site and try to get eyes on the raven. While preparing to SP (conduct a search patrol) the ANA got cold feet and decided they did not want to do the dismounted patrol.”

In the end the soldiers did set out to search for the crashed drone, but they had to turn back because insurgents were reportedy already waiting for the opportunity to ambush the soldiers as they attempted to salvage the drone.

ordered by his seemingly trigger-happy predecessor, George W. Bush.

The unmanned assassin can fly for more than 20 hours and kill at lightning speed. But they are not always reliable. According to official reports, 38 Predator and Reaper drones have crashed while on combat missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, while a further nine have crashed during test flights on military bases in the US. Each crash costs the government between $3.7 million (€2.8 million) and $5 million.

The US Department of Defense accident reports show that system failures, computer glitches and human errors are common occurrences during drone missions. It seems that serious problems were ignored because of the need for the drones to be deployed as quickly as possible. The new weapon was urgently in demand following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 and the hasty start of the invasion of Afghanistan.

“The drones were not ready for going into combat,” says Travis Burdine, manager of the Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force. “We had no time to iron out the problems.” Burdine’s statement is backed up by reports in the war logs. Indeed, the quiet killers seem to have a lot of defects.

It is not just the costs incurred by these crashes that worry the US military. Even the smaller reconnaissance drones are packed with complicated computer technology — advances the military doesn’t want to fall into enemy hands. Both Reapers and Predators have a so-called “zero out” function, which allows data to be deleted remotely. Unfortunately, this feature sometimes fails. And out of fear that important information could fall into the hands of the Taliban, each drone crash necessitates elaborate — and dangerous — salvage operations.

System Failures, Computer Glitches and Human Error

Indeed, the secret memos reveal the drawbacks of a weapon that has been lauded by the US military as a panacea, a view shared by the president. In his short time in office, Barack Obama has unleashed double the number of drone missions

————

The Secret Enemy in Pakistan

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s secret service, originally helped to build up and deploy the Taliban after Afghanistan descended into a bitter and fratricidal civil war between the mujahedeen who had prevailed over the Soviets and forced their withdrawal. Despite all of the reassurances from Pakistani politicians that the old ties are cut, the country is still pursuing an ambiguous policy in the region — at once serving as both an ally to the US and as a helper to its enemy.

There is plenty of new evidence to support this thesis. The documents clearly show that the Pakistani intelligence agency is the most important accomplice the Taliban has outside of Afghanistan. The war against the Afghan security forces, the Americans and their ISAF allies is still being conducted from Pakistan.

The country is an important safe haven for enemy forces — and serves as a base for issuing their deployment. New recruits to the Taliban stream across the Pakistan-Afghan border, including feared foreign fighters — among them Arabs, Chechnyans, Uzbekis, Uighurs and even European Islamists.

According to the war logs, the ISI envoys are present when insurgent commanders hold war councils — and even give specific orders to carry out murders. These include orders to try to assassinate Afghan President Hamid Karzai. For example, a threat report dated August 21, 2008 warned: “Colonel Mohammad Yusuf from the ISI had directed Taliban official Maulawi Izzatullah to see that Karzai was assassinated.”

Former Pakistan intelligence chief General Hamid Gul plays a prominent role in the ISI documents. After he left office, Gul came across in the Western media as a kind of propagandist for the Taliban. In the documents, Gul is depicted as an important source of aid to the Taliban and even, in one report, as “a leader” of the insurgents. One threat report from Jan. 14, 2008 claims that he coordinated the planned kidnapping of United Nations employees on Highway 1 between Kabul and Jalalabad.

The memos state that Gul ordered suicide attacks, and they also describe the former intelligence chief as one of the most important suppliers of weaponry to the Taliban. One report mentions a convoy of 65 trucks carrying munitions that Gul allegedly organized for the Taliban. Another claims the ISI delivered 1,000 motorcycles to the Haqqanis, a warlord family led by Sirajuddin Haqqani who — together with the Taliban and Hekmatyar — are among the three greatest opponents of Western forces in Afghanistan. Another mentions 7,000 weapons that were sent to the border province of Kunar, including Kalashnikovs, mortars and Strella rockets.

Still, even those who drew up the reports are uncertain of their veracity. This kind of uncertainty creeps up often in the documents. They reveal the great weakness of the US communications strategy.

Addressing the facets about Pakistan, White House official Rhodes responded: “The status quo is not acceptable, which is precisely why the United States had focused so much on this challenge. Pakistan is moving in the right direction, but more must be done. The safe havens for violent extremist groups within Pakistan continue to pose an intolerable threat to the United States, to Afghanistan and to the Pakistani people who have suffered greatly from terrorism. The Pakistani government — and Pakistan’s military and intelligence services — must continue their strategic shift against violent extremist groups within their borders and stay on the offensive against them.”

—-

Intelligence Agents Flooding in Data

America’s intelligence agencies are drowning in a sea of data. Fearful of repeating the intelligence mistakes that occurred prior to 9/11, analysts seem to be blindly reporting every single thing.

Security experts have been complaining for some time that these countless reports concentrate too heavily on the opinions and the movements of the enemy — in this case on the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Far too many analysts and too many reconnaissance flights seem to be concerned with sketching out the hierarchy of the insurgents’ networks and creating lists of enemies who should be killed or captured. Intelligence agents are constantly gathering statements from local informants, whose eagerness to please the Americans often surpasses their reliability.

Yet the most serious issues are too often overlooked: The protection of the Afghan civilians, the analysis of the political environment and the search for solution to this endless conflict.

One thing, however, is certain. These thousands of secret documents indicate that, after almost nine years of war, a victory in Hindu Kush looks farther away than ever.

Taliban in Karachi

 

Pakistan Today

Taliban in Karachi: Some very interesting Reports in Videos —What are the answers to counter this?

 Children of the Taliban

Why we can’t reach them when others they can. http://video.nytimes.com/video/2009/04/24/multimedia/1194839767942/children-of-the-taliban.html

A Militant Hideaway

http://video.nytimes.com/video/2009/07/17/world/1247463484696/a-militant-hideaway.html

U.S. Concerns as Taliban Advance

http://video.nytimes.com/video/2009/04/23/world/asia/1194839751429/u-s-concerns-as-taliban-advance.html

Prominent Taliban Commander Captured

http://video.nytimes.com/video/2010/02/16/world/1247467051774/prominent-taliban-commander-captured.html

———

Tax-Free Living in Pakistan

http://video.nytimes.com/video/2010/07/18/world/asia/1247468421481/tax-free-living-in-pakistan.html

Pakistan’s Elite Pay Few Taxes, Widening Gap

By SABRINA TAVERNISE —NY TIMES    July 18,  2010

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Much of Pakistan’s capital city looks like a rich Los Angeles suburb. Shiny sport utility vehicles purr down gated driveways. Elegant multistory homes are tended by servants. Laundry is never hung out to dry.

 But behind the opulence lurks a troubling fact. Very few of these households pay income tax. That is mostly because the politicians who make the rules are also the country’s richest citizens, and are skilled at finding ways to exempt themselves.

 That would be a problem in any country. But in Pakistan, the lack of a workable tax system feeds something more menacing: a festering inequality in Pakistani society, where the wealth of its most powerful members is never redistributed or put to use for public good. That is creating conditions that have helped spread an insurgency that is tormenting the country and complicating American policy in the region.

 It is also a sorry performance for a country that is among the largest recipients of American aid, payments of billions of dollars that prop up the country’s finances and are meant to help its leaders fight the insurgency.

 Though the authorities have tried to expand the net in recent years, taxing profits from the stock market and real estate, entire swaths of the economy, like agriculture, a major moneymaker for the elite, remain untaxed.

 “This is a system of the elite, by the elite and for the elite,” said Riyaz Hussain Naqvi, a retired government official who worked in tax collection for 38 years. “It is a skewed system in which the poor man subsidizes the rich man.”

 The problem starts at the top. The average worth of Pakistani members of Parliament is $900,000, with its richest member topping $37 million, according to a December study by the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency in Islamabad.

 While Pakistan’s income from taxes last year was the lowest in the country’s history, according to Zafar ul-Majeed, a senior official in the Federal Board of Revenue, the assets of current members of Parliament nearly doubled from those of members of the previous Parliament, the institute study found.

The country’s top opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif, reported that he paid no personal income tax for three years ending in 2007 in public documents he filed with Pakistan’s election commission. A spokesman for Mr. Sharif, an industrialist who is widely believed to be a millionaire, said he had been in exile and had turned over positions in his companies to relatives.

A month of requests for similar documents for Pakistan’s president and prime minister went unanswered by the commission; representatives for the men said they did not have the figures.

“Taxes are the Achilles’ heel of Pakistani politicians,” said Jahangir Tareen, a businessman and member of Parliament who is trying to put taxes on the public agenda. He paid $225,534 in income tax in 2009, a figure he made public in Parliament last month. “If you don’t have income, fine, but then don’t go and get into a Land Cruiser.”

 The rules say that anyone who earns more than $3,488 a year must pay income tax, but few do. Akbar Zaidi, a Karachi-based political economist with the Carnegie Endowment, estimates that as many as 10 million Pakistanis should be paying income tax, far more than the 2.5 million who are registered.

 Out of more than 170 million Pakistanis, fewer than 2 percent pay income tax, making Pakistan’s revenue from taxes among the lowest in the world, a notch below Sierra Leone’s as a ratio of tax to gross domestic product.

Mr. Zaidi blames the United States and its perpetual bailouts of Pakistan for the minuscule tax revenues from rich and poor alike. “The Americans should say: ‘Enough. Sort it out yourselves. Get your house in order first,’ ” he argued. “But you are cowards. You are afraid to take that chance.”

 Much of the tax avoidance, especially by the wealthy, is legal. Under a 1990s law that has become one of the main tools to legalize undocumented — or illegally obtained — money made in Pakistan, authorities here are not allowed to question money transferred from abroad. Businessmen and politicians channel billions of rupees through Dubai back to Pakistan, no questions asked.

 “In this country, no one asks, ‘How did you get that flat in Mayfair?’ ” said Shabbar Zaidi, a partner at A. F. Ferguson & Company, an accounting firm in Karachi, referring to an affluent area of London. “It’s a very good country for the rich man. Chauffeurs, servants, big houses. The question is, who is suffering? The common man.”

Then there are the tax-free goods supposedly meant for Afghanistan. Mr. Zaidi said much stayed in Pakistan illegally, including 50,000 tons of black tea that were imported last year. Afghans drink green tea.

“As per our information, not a single cup of black tea was drunk in Afghanistan,” he said.

Tax collectors try to be tough. When Mr. Naqvi headed the tax authority, he tried to conduct a broad audit, prompting howls of protest. Lawyers from the Lahore High Court Bar Association — also evaders — even issued a ruling against him.

 Mr. Majeed said his collectors now use individual electric bills to track down rich evaders, on the assumption that high bills mean air-conditioning, which means wealth. They recently issued hundreds of warnings to rich houses in Islamabad. But going after politicians, he said, is tricky. “Not while they’re in power,” he said, smiling.

 Tax collection has risen by about 20 percent a year recently, he said, though it barely registers as an increase because more than half of Pakistan’s economy is off the books.

Lacking the political will to collect income tax, Pakistan resorts to easier measures, like the sales tax, considered less fair because it hits the poor as hard as the rich. Muhamed Azhar, 26, a chauffeur in Karachi with a $123-a-month salary, pays the same sales tax rate as a National Assembly member who makes $1,400 a month with benefits. Earnings from real estate and land are rarely declared.

 “The big people ruling us have houses and servants, and they should pay taxes,” Mr. Azhar said, watching motorcades of sport utility vehicles zip by, en route to the local Parliament. He sometimes wonders whether they are even going to work at all. With all the tinted windows, guards and fuss, he has never actually seen them.

The overwhelming majority of Pakistan’s tax burden is carried by the manufacturing sector for the domestic market, which, according to Mr. Majeed, makes up only 19 percent of Pakistan’s economy but pays 51 percent of its taxes.

 Most economic activity takes place in the shadows. Merchants — the most vociferous opponents of a value-added tax, a tax the International Monetary Fund has pressed Pakistan to adopt largely because it would require documentation — make up a fifth of the economy, but carry 6 percent of its tax burden. Out of millions of shops in Pakistan, just 160,000 are now registered for a general sales tax, Mr. Majeed said.

Particularly galling for Pakistan’s middle class is the lack of a federal tax on agriculture, an industry that employs nearly half of Pakistan’s population and whose profits go largely to the wealthy landowners who pack local Parliaments. When the World Bank finally forced adoption of a modest provincial tax in 1997 as a condition for a loan, few paid.

 M. Tareen, the member of Parliament, said that when he first tried to pay, tax collectors refused to take the money, not wanting to rock the boat. He had to write a letter to a senior official to have it accepted.

 It was not always like this. Nasir Aslam Zahid, a former Supreme Court justice in his 70s, blames what he calls moral decay in Pakistani society, in which respect for rules has fallen, merit has been forgotten and cheating has become a way of life.

“In my time, it was considered a moral thing for a person to file a tax return,” he said. “Today, corruption has broken all records.”

Salman Masood contributed reporting.

 

A de facto partition of Afghanistan may bring Victory for US

Compiled by A Khokar      July 18, 2010

The Obama administration’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan seems headed for failure. Given the alternatives, de facto partition of Afghanistan is on the table which is being considered as the best policy option available to the United States and its allies and mark it a Victory..

Even after the change of war horses that Gen David Petraeus, Iraqi insurgency fame commander is now the head of the forces in Afghanistan; this is felt that U.S. polity should stop talking about timelines and exit strategies and accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of its historic stronghold in the Pashtun south. But Washington could ensure that north and west Afghanistan do not succumb to jihadi extremism, using U.S. air power and Special Forces along with the Afghan army and like-minded nations.

Enthusiasts for the administration’s counterinsurgency strategy, or COIN, are likely to reject this way forward in Afghanistan. They will rightly point out the many complexities in implementing de facto partition.

De facto partition is clearly not the best outcome one can imagine for the United States in Afghanistan. But it is now the best outcome that Washington can achieve consistent with vital national interests and U.S. domestic politics.

There are many reasons for this.

Even if President Barack Obama adds a year or two to his timeline for major progress, the COIN strategy appears unlikely to succeed. Given the number of U.S. combat forces now fighting, the Taliban cannot be sufficiently weakened in Pashtun Afghanistan to drive it to the negotiating table on any reasonable timeline. True, the Afghan Pashtun are not a unified group. But they do agree on opposing foreign occupation and wanting Pashtun supremacy.

“We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation,” CIA Director Leon Panetta said on June 27, “where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce Al Qaeda, where they would really try to become part of that society. … Unless they’re convinced the United States is going to win and that they are going to be defeated, I think it is very difficult to proceed with a reconciliation that is going to be meaningful.”

With an occupying army largely ignorant of local history, tribal structures, language, customs, politics and values, the United States cannot, through social engineering, win over, in the foreseeable future, sufficient numbers of the Afghan Pashtun on whom COIN depends.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s deeply corrupt government — as unpopular as the Taliban — shows no sign of improvement, and Afghanistan has no history of a robust central government. Allied efforts to substitute Western nation building for Afghan nation building will continue to fall short. The Afghanistan National Army is not expected to be ready to vanquish the Taliban for many years, if ever.

Moreover, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services, with their dominating optic of India as the enemy, have shown no willingness to end support for their long-time Afghan Taliban proxies — or accept a truly independent Afghanistan.

Decisively, the long-term COIN strategy and far shorter U.S. political timeline are flawed and incompatible.

The lack of progress in substantially pacifying Pashtun Afghanistan before Obama’s July 2011 decision date will become increasingly clear — though proponents are sure to focus more on the costs of failure than on the likelihood of enduring success.

What then? If the COIN strategy cannot produce the desired results in the next 12 months, the US administration has six broad policy alternatives:

1) It can stay the course with the failing COIN strategy or even “double down” on the U.S. commitment — despite the lack of intrinsic U.S. vital national interests tied to Afghanistan.

2) It can seek other ways to entice the Afghan Taliban to end violence and enter into a coalition government. Karzai now seems to be pursuing this, but his efforts cannot alter the grim realities on the Pashtun battlefield or Taliban sustained intransigence. There is famous proverb: Why negotiate if you believe you are winning?

3) It can try to save parts of Pashtun Afghanistan, locale by locale — in an ink-blot strategy — fighting in some areas and acquiescing in others. But this would mean continuing major U.S. and NATO casualties in the south. It would also allow the Taliban — like the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese — to concentrate its forces, ink blot by ink blot, among a sympathetic or intimidated local Pashtun population. In any case, it only delays the inevitable when U.S. forces depart.

4) It can opt, as Vice President Joe Biden reportedly counselled before Obama’s surge decision, not to fight the Taliban in the countryside. It can, instead, defend Kabul and Kandahar (epicentre of the Pashtun and the Taliban’s spiritual birthplace), intensify efforts to lure Taliban who can be bought with money or political power and work with local warlords rather than the central government.

5) It can initiate rapid withdrawal of all American forces, which would produce a strategic calamity for the United States. For it could lead, first, to all-out Afghan civil war; then, to the Taliban’s probable conquest of the entire country. Since Afghanistan’s neighbours would very likely be drawn in, it could ultimately destabilize the entire region.

It could also dramatically increase likelihood of the Islamic radicalization of Pakistan, which then calls into question the security of its nuclear arsenal. It might also weaken, if not rupture, the budding U.S.-India strategic partnership.

In addition, it would profoundly undermine NATO, perhaps persuading the alliance to never again go “out of area.” It could trigger global support for Islamic extremist ideology and increased terrorism against liberal societies everywhere.

And worldwide, friends and adversaries alike would see it as a failure of international leadership and strategic resolve by an ever weaker United States, with destructive aftershocks for years to come.

6) Or it can adopt new U.S. policy goals for Afghanistan that, realistically, have a better chance of succeeding. This means accepting a de facto partition, enforced by U.S. and NATO air power and Special Forces, the Afghan army and international partners.

After years of faulty U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, there are no quick, easy and cost-free ways to escape the current deadly quagmire. But with all its problems, de facto partition offers the best available U.S. alternative to strategic defeat.

***Announcing that US will retain an active combat role in Afghanistan for years to come and may do not accept permanent Taliban control of the south, the United States and its allies could withdraw combat forces from most of Pashtun Afghanistan (about half the country), including Kandahar, over several months.

US forces would stop fighting and dying in the mountains, valleys and urban areas of southern Afghanistan — where 102 coalition soldiers were killed in June, the most in any month of the war and almost three times as many as a year ago. But US may be ready to assist tribal leaders on the Pashtun periphery, who may decide to resist the Taliban.

US may focus on defending the northern and western regions — containing roughly 60 percent of the population. These areas, including Kabul, are not Pashtun dominated, and locals are largely sympathetic to U.S. efforts.

US may offer the Afghan Taliban an agreement in which neither side seeks to enlarge its territory — if the Taliban stopped supporting terrorism, a proposal that they would almost certainly reject.

US may then make it clear that we would rely heavily on U.S. air power and special forces to target any Al Qaeda base in Afghanistan, as well as Afghan Taliban leaders who aided them. It would also target Afghan Taliban encroachments across the de facto partition lines and terrorist sanctuaries along the Pakistan border.

It is expected that careful analysis are carried out and this might mean a long-time residual U.S. military force in Afghanistan of about 40,000 to 50,000 troops. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and supportive Pashtun in this endeavour may be enlisted as well as US, NATO allies, Russia, India, Iran, perhaps China, Central Asian nations and, one hopes the U.N. Security Council also.

US may continue accelerating Afghan army training. That would devote nation-building efforts to the northern and western regions, where, unlike the Pashtun areas, people are found less conflicted about accepting U.S. help and not systematically coerced by the Taliban.

There might even come a time when a stronger Afghan National Army could take control of the Pashtun areas.

Such fundamentally changed U.S. objectives and strategies regarding Afghanistan would dramatically reduce U.S. military causalities and thus minimize domestic political pressure for hasty withdrawal. It would substantially lower US budget-breaking military expenditures on Afghanistan — now nearly $7 billion per month.

This would also allow the U.S. Army and Marines to recover from years of fighting two ground wars; increase the likelihood that our coalition allies, with fewer casualties, might remain over the long term; encourage most of Afghanistan’s neighbours to support an acceptable stabilization of the country and reduce Islamabad’s ability to parlay the U.S. ground role in southern Afghanistan into tolerance for terrorism thought to be emanating from Pakistan.

In addition, it would allow Washington to focus on four issues more vital to its future national interests: the rise of Chinese power, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, nuclear terrorism from Pakistan and the future of Iraq.

There are certainly problems with this approach:

The Taliban could trumpet victory or not accept a sustained status quo and continually test America’s resolve. It is likely that lower-level violence would persist in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, especially in the south. Pashtun Afghanistan could again become a hotbed of international terrorism, a dangerous outcome that probably could only be avoided by U.S. combat forces fighting there for years — and, in any case, the current Al Qaeda epicentre is in Pakistan.

In the context of de facto partition, the sky over Pashtun Afghanistan would be dark with manned and unmanned coalition aircraft — targeting not only terrorists but, as necessary, the new Taliban government in all its dimensions. Taliban civil officials — like governors, mayors, judges and tax collectors — would wake up every morning not knowing if they would survive the day in their offices, while involved in daily activities or at home at night.

But there would be no mountain caves in which they could hide and, at the same time, do their jobs. Over time, that could produce some degree of deterrence against Taliban support for terrorism.

Pakistan would likely oppose de facto partition. Managing Islamabad’s reaction would be no easy task — not least because the Pakistan military expects a strategic gain once the U.S. military withdraws from Afghanistan.

Indeed, Islamabad might need to be persuaded to concentrate, with the United States, on defeating the Pakistan Taliban and containing the Afghan Taliban to avoid momentum toward a fracturing of the Pakistan state.

There might be potential pockets of fifth column Pashtun in the north and west. Karzai and his associates would almost certainly resist partition — and might not remain in power. Fearing a return of Pakistan dominance in Afghanistan, India would likely encourage Washington to continue ground combat in the south for many years to come — and would have to be told that was not in the cards.

Human rights in the Taliban-controlled areas would also probably be abysmal, including for minorities.

Putting together a coalition of like-minded nations to implement this strategy would be a daunting diplomatic challenge — not least with Tehran.

But even with all the challenges, defacto partition may be done sooner rather than persist until US current COIN strategy has failed, triggering a domestic political eruption and, perhaps, a disastrous total U.S. military withdrawal.

Will Washington wait to change its objective and strategy in Afghanistan until even more U.S. blood and treasure have been lost in a fruitless quest among the Afghan Pashtun and the Taliban proclaims that it has mighty America, like the Soviets, on the run out of Afghanistan.

US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton Upcoming tour for strategic dialogues with Pakistani authorities is seen as very important visit.

Source: Adab Arz-Veranda Talk Forum

(Discussion on US National Security and Strategic Planning)

All has just gone with the Wind

 By A Khokar   July 18, 2010

The most famous speech of Qaid e Azam (ra) which is quoted the most; is the speech of 11th August 1947 when he said: “You are free; free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State.”

That was the dream that Quid e Azam dreamt; but where is that Pakistan now and where is that dream….? All has just gone with the wind. Half of Pakistan was lost in 1971 and remaining half has gone to scavengers that the savages are busy dragging it like their prey and scavenging it ….!

The creed of Mullah who opposed the creation of Pakistan has somehow managed to catch up atop and have come to the stage, where this creed is fast spreading its religious spell over the masses in the name of Islam? Destruction, anarchy, killing through suicidal actions in the name of Islam has become the norms. This society is emerging as the most intolerant and extremist society.

But realistically speaking Qaid E Azam dreamt of creating a country—- not for Islam but for the Muslims—- that he saw it was untenable for Muslims who have ruled this subcontinent–India for long hundreds of years; and that now they would never be able to reconcile with an idea of a subservient status or may live as minority with Dalit like slave and menial status— in a Hindu dominant society.

But this nation has lost its way and is heading for darkness; Ek Kahani Khatum hoiee Anjam say Pehlay hee.