To Drag Zardari in NRO Scandal is Not Justified

By    A Khokar     17 December 2009-12-17

Kudos to CJP, I M Choudhary that he has been able to read the writings on the wall and felt the prevalent heat in the Pakistani streets that NRO was never a reconciliation and neither it carried any conciliatory spirit in it but was a verdict since ordained to facilitate a few and enable them to re-enter this country safely and take charge the rein of Government. Rightly so, The Apex court; the supreme Court of Pakistan finding the NRO against the spirit of Constitution of Pakistan has declared the NRO as ‘void ab initio’ (as it was never there).

For Public Consumption this scandal was duly wrapped with the hint of reconciliation and labelled as national reconciliation order.

It was a new tactical manoeuvre since crafted by CIA to try and have a blood less regime change; a form of coup in a proxy country like Pakistan where CIA wanted to install the persons of their choice and had selected Miss. Benazir Bhutto. Reputedly she was trained by CIA; nurtured and moulded like the Chicago boys of late seventies in the light of Milton Friedman doctrine—-where special Chilean and Brazilian groups were trained in United States and were sent back to their countries. They were asked to run a run of economic advancement scheme through ‘creation of economic disaster and anarchy’ and see how best it achieves the required result to subjugate the people of targeted country. After General Augusto Pinochet of Chilly; General Pervez Musharraf along with Miss Benazir was the chosen one in Pakistan in order to subjugate this powerful nation which possessed the nuclear armaments.   

Miss Benazir was given a special programme to run this country on a given CIA lines. General Pervez Musharraf in power in Pakistan was asked to make necessary arrangements to give her the red carpeted reception for her safe landing. Accordingly grounds were softened up and general Election was also duly orchestrated to hand over the rein of government to her.

Election schedule was announced but it could be felt that after arrival in Pakistan Miss Benazir— on seeing her victory stage drawn so near—- had a change of hearts. A clear mode of defiance was found displayed in her conduct. There were clear signs of betrayal found surfacing in her daily rhetoric and political plans. Musharraf who was supposed to be given a safe exit; it was seen that it would be denied to him. CIA plan was seen going topsy-turvy. Warning shots for Benazir were also sounded but finding her trekking the path of denial——— the lady—an able daughter of this nation was taken off the scene for her betrayal. She was eliminated right before she could assume the command of this nation.

After Miss Benazir Bhutto, the assuming of seat of power by Asif Ali Zardari is just incidental that after her sad demise; PPP could reap a sweeping sympathy vote and man being the widower of Benazir was crowned on top to occupy an ancestral seat of his party. His entry is simply incidental. Under the circumstances he may be seen as a beneficiary of NRO also that he came in Benazir Bhutto’s knapsack as luggage —but to blemish him being the prime suspected character in NRO scandal is not justified.

 “America has no friends, only interests,” says the US foreign policy dream doctor Henry Kissinger. It is seen that entry for all the US proxies is always with great pomp and show but their tenure always terminates like the fate of General Augusto Pinochet or President Saddam Hussein that utter humiliation becomes their fate and Gallows awaits them at the end—— This could have not been different for Miss Benazir Bhutto?

But—- sorry for those darling buds of May that they were plucked before they could bloom.[ Afsous un ghunchoon peh hey; jo bin khilay murgha gaey]

Link reference:


Quetta Attack Plan


By A Khokar           16 December 2009

When President Obama explained his decision to send 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan to support General Stanley McChrystal’s new counterinsurgency campaign, he left a key question unanswered: Will this be enough to achieve U.S. strategic ends in Af-Pak?

U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine calls for a security force ratio of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents for success. Afghanistan’s population of 28.4 million means the combined ISAF and Afghan security forces would need to number between 568,000 and 710,000.

The Afghans now have approximately 170,000 national police and army forces and the United States and ISAF have 107,000 troops. Adding 40,000 U.S. and alliance troops will bring the total to 317,000—nowhere near the Army’s own doctrinal guidelines.

Therefore, the success of the campaign will be highly contingent on an Afghan security force that is far larger than its current size—McChrystal wants 400,000—and much more capable and reliable. Given the state of the Afghan government, the near-term likelihood of a markedly greater contribution from these forces is remote at best.

President Obama’s decision on a timetable for withdrawal of American troops by July 2011 makes the entire plan flawed—- or can be said phoney and misleading. While the clock is ticking in Afghanistan the top American commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, may find that there are many issues to focus on: building more competent Afghan Army and police forces, adopting more effective anticorruption measures and reintegrating “moderate” Taliban and other insurgent fighters into Afghan society and politics programme by next year only makes it unachievable.


 But perhaps the most difficult issue is largely outside of General McChrystal’s control undermining the Taliban’s sanctuary in Pakistan says the think tank—Rand Corporation. It suggests that thus far, there has been no substantive action taken against the Taliban leadership in Baluchistan Province, south of the Pashtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan. It is felt that this is the same mistake the Soviets made in the 1980s, when they failed to act against the seven major mujahedeen groups headquartered in Pakistan.

There is strong belief that where as Pak Army is vigorously engaging its own Taliban groups in Waziristan, this Baluchistan sanctuary is critical because, allegedly the Afghan war is organized and run out of Baluchistan. Virtually all significant meetings of the Taliban take place in that province, and many of the group’s senior leaders and military commanders are based there. The local ISAF command in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, across the border from Baluchistan believes that Taliban sanctuary in Baluchistan is catastrophic for US as the local Taliban fighters get strategic and operational guidance from across the border, as well as supplies and technical components for their improvised explosive devices.”

This is also believed that like a typical business, the Taliban in Pakistan have an organizational structure divided into functional committees. It has a media committee; a military committee; a finance committee responsible for acquiring and managing funds; and so forth. The Taliban’s inner shura, or governing council, exerts authority over lower-level Taliban fighters. It is composed of the supreme Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, his principal deputy, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, his military commander, Abdullah Zakir, and roughly a dozen other key leaders. Many Taliban leaders have moved their families to Baluchistan, and reportedly their children attend Pakistani schools.

 Yet Pakistan and the United States have failed to target them systematically says the US secretary of State; Hilary Clinton. Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps forces have conducted operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas to the north, and the United States has conducted many drone strikes there. But relatively little has been done in Baluchistan.

This seems to be a point of contention that United States and Pakistan must act now to target Taliban leaders in Baluchistan. The cost of failing to act in Baluchistan is seen an enormous.

On the other hand the internal security of Pakistan is also at stake that ‘large swathes of Pakistan remain outside government control, run by the Pakistani Taliban and tribal leaders looking for establishing a Islamic Emirate of their own in areas extending from Swatt- Malakand to Waziristan and Baluchistan. This year’s military campaign to roll back Taliban territorial gains saw a number of successes, but insurgents have shown they can launch major attacks in key urban, industrial and commercial centres with relative impunity. The ability of militants to launch attacks as several assaults on key military facilities in particular have shown the continued ability of Taliban militants to attack even protected targets. There is no sign of a sustained improvement in security despite offensives against the Taliban.’


It is said that this is likely to make the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal a major issue. Pakistan’s poor record of preventing attacks even on secure military targets has raised concerns that militants could penetrate a nuclear facility. Analysts say that while there is minimal risk that insurgents could get their hands on a nuclear missile, a potential danger is that they could steal some fissile material which could be used to build a “dirty bomb”.


A pretext is in building fast to push wage a war—— inside Pakistan that owing to the Pak Military extra ordinary engagement in Waziristan in the north where they may remain busy for a considerable long time in order to accomplish their unfinished task. Pak military forces may not be able to help US capture the Taliban leadership reportedly located near Quetta in Baluchistan within the time frame set by Obama. For which aerial raids by US marines must be conducted or Taliban leadership must be hit by drone strikes, as the United States and Pakistan have done so effectively in the tribal areas.

 Links references; Adab-, Rand Corporation and Reuters


Barack Obama delivers a speech of a Flawed Plan



Composed by A Khokar     5 Dec 2009

The US President has given us a strong military plan, but where was the political strategy — and usual confidence which symbolizes a US President; says right minded Paddy Ashdown-Bosnia fame International Community’s High representative.

The Taliban’s favourite phrase in recent months has been: “The elephant is down, now all we have to do is— slay it.”

The best thing about this week’s Obama speech was that Taliban they now know the elephant is not down; it is engaging the fight with renewed strength, determination and vigour. The Taliban may be under pressure but is this enough for success in the war of Afghanistan; however limited the success may be? The answer is no.

The Obama speech gave us, in short, a military plan — but not yet a political one.

When General Stanley McChrystal sent his proposal to the President, it included a carefully integrated plan for both the military (broadly, an extra 30,000 troops and a focus on protecting the people, not chasing the enemy) and the political aspect. The speech contained the first but was almost silent on the second. Perhaps this is still to come. But if it is not, then what we have heard so far will not be enough.

What the President intended was for audiences in the US and Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan to hear different things. His message to the domestic audience was supposed to be “troops home in 18 months” and to the Taliban, “30,000 extra troops”. But unfortunately the wrong people got the wrong message. What the US heard was “30,000 more troops” while what the Taliban heard was “in 18 months, they’ll be gone”.

The Taliban commander Mullah Omar once famously said: “They may have the watches, but we have the time.” I fear we may have inadvertently given volume to that message. I understand the temptation of timelines and exit strategies for those who have to win back home a domestic support. But Obama has told the Taliban that how long they have to wait before US forces give up.

It is far better to deal with these things through milestones rather than timelines. For instance US could set milestones for the growth and professionalization of the Afghan Army and police, set target times for them to be delivered and, as they are, hand over the functions to Afghan structures and pull out.

A mission implementation plan for Afghanistan, capable of being debated back home and providing a visible road map of progress for Afghans as well, is a better way to gain public support than the artificial deadlines that, in the case of July 2011, looks as almost undeliverable.

It is not difficult to see why the President felt that he needed, for domestic purposes, to say that withdrawal would start in July 2011. But this does not make it right.


Other elements of the strategy were also either missing or too lightly glossed over.

First and foremost, there was nothing about the absolute necessity to ensure that, at last and after six damaging years of muddle, the tower of Babel that is the international community in Afghanistan will now work to a single plan, act on a single set of priorities and speak with a single voice. It is the absence of this, more than anything else that has caused the failures and cost so many lives. The only person whose authority is powerful enough to bash international heads together and make this happen is the US President. Yet there was nothing of this in his speech.

Second, what political element there was in the President’s speech seemed to rely still on the belief that President Karzai is reform able and will reform. Some might think this a triumph of hope over experience. Of course Afghanistan’s newly elected President cannot be changed that there is no option—– but to support him. But that does not mean that all the eggs be piled up into this rather rickety basket.

One of the impediments to success in Afghanistan is that US have been trying to force a Western-style centralized constitution on to a country whose traditions have been tribal and local for 1,000 years. This is a golden opportunity to begin to shift the weight of effort away from strengthening Kabul, to building up governance from the bottom. This would at once give a political strategy that runs with, rather than against, the grain of Afghan society, while creating the best context for a serious programme of reconciliation with the tribally based Taliban.

Taliban reconciliation was mentioned in the President’s speech — but only with a single, almost off-hand, remark. Yet this was a main plank of the McChrystal strategy which needs to be made clear here. Taliban reconciliation is not an easy option to hard fighting. It may always be possible to split the oddly low-level Taliban commander away with a bag of gold or the promise of a job. But serious negotiation with a Taliban prepared to put aside the gun in favour of pursuing constitutional means will never come while they think — with justification — that they are winning on the battlefield.

Every body hoped to see, in the long awaited Obama‘s speech a clear statement of a wider regional strategy that would include not just Pakistan but also Iran, India, and maybe even Russia and China. Without this the success will certainly be much more difficult.

On the other hand, on the arrival of US troops in Afghanistan, other than about 10000 that they will be deployed in Helmed which has become a secured strong hold of US forces likr Green Zone in Baghdad-Iraq; about 5000 of them will be sent to the adjacent province of Kandahar to be deployed along Pakistan border which means that Pakistan will feel all the heat on this new war escalation on this front.


There has been lot of anarchy and devastation that US with its subversive activities through its agents Tehrik e Taliban in Pakistan; since it is raised and supported by US that these stooges have brought so much of devastation in Pakistan in the Khyber Pass enclave in the north. They are very much threatening the very heartland and capital of Islamabad. The new escalation of US forces deployment in south along second major Pakistan’s Bolan Pass on Hindu Kush ranges may leave the south western enclave of Baluchistan most vulnerable for exploitations, where the situation is already tense and life is seen in peril at the hands of separatist.

President Obama has formidable gifts of oratory and he deploys them very confidently but the old Obama so famously comfortable in his own skin; seemed distinctly uncomfortable while posing as a war escalating leader. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, too, looked especially miserable talking of conflict and seen simply seconding Obama’s new verdict in his recent communiqués and alleging Pakistan for harbouring Al Qaeda fugitives.

But one thing is evident that there is a devil trying to click the war map to enlarge open in New Window and trying his best to stay put in this area for a long time to come.

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